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Misconduct in organizations (such as fraud, stealing, deception, and harming others) is
not only a matter of some “bad apples” but also related to the organizational context
(“bad barrels”), which can facilitate either ethical or unethical behaviors. Given the
financial crisis and recurring corporate ethics scandals, policymakers, regulators and
organizations are interested in how to change their organizational cultures to enhance
ethical behavior and to prevent further disasters. For this purpose, organizations need
to better understand what strategies and factors of the organizational environment
can affect (un)ethical behavior. However, to assess the corporate ethical culture, solid
measures are required. Since there is an urgent need to have a German measure to
promote research in German-speaking countries, this research developed and tested
the German Ethical Culture Scale (GECS). Drawing on a prominent approach that has
received much attention from scholars and practitioners alike, the GECS attempts to
integrate the notion of compliance- and integrity-based ethics programs (with its focus
on how to steer organizations) with the notion of ethical culture (with its focus on what
factors inhibit or foster ethical behavior). Three studies with heterogeneous samples
of German and Swiss employees and managers were conducted to develop, test
and validate the multidimensional scale (total N > 2000). Overall, the studies provide
first evidence of the measure’s construct, criteria-related and incremental validity. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the GECS and
implications for future research.
Keywords: ethical culture measure, compliance-based culture, integrity-based culture, ethics management,
organizational culture
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis and recurring corporate ethics scandals have strengthened the interest of
policymakers, regulators and industry in leveraging corporate culture to enhance ethical behavior.
There is broad consensus that misconduct in organizations (such as fraud, stealing, deception, and
harming others) is not only a matter of some “bad apples” but also related to the organizational
context (“bad barrels”), which can facilitate either ethical or unethical behaviors. To manage this
challenge, organizations need to better understand what strategies and factors that make up the
organizational environment influence (un)ethical behavior. For this purpose, solid measures are
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required that allow assessing those dimensions, help to provide
benchmarks and allow reflecting progress in firms’ cultures. The
goal of our research is to develop and provide a first testing
of a German measure of features of a corporate ethical culture.
While most research in this field has mainly been conducted
drawing on English measures, a German measure on ethical
culture is still lacking. There is an urgent need to develop a
German measure to make it possible to advance research on
ethical culture in countries with German-speaking populations,
such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, which encompass
an overall population of approximately 100 million people.
However, it is about not only the possibility of advancing research
in German-speaking countries but also offering organizations
in those countries instruments to obtain information about
the existing organizational environment in the firm, to deduce
interventions and to monitor potential progress. Not all firms are
international, so it cannot be expected that all people understand
and speak English fluently.
Conceptually, over the past decades, three main research
lines have emerged that examine the ethical environment of
an organization: A first stream is related to the notion of
ethical climate. Most research in this field has referred to the
seminal work by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988). According to
them, ethical climate refers to shared perceptions about “what
constitutes right behavior” in an organization, thus delivering
guidelines for the employees on how they should behave (Martin
and Cullen, 2006, p. 177). In their pioneering work, Victor
and Cullen also developed the Ethical Climate Questionnaire
(ECQ), which was originally designed to assess nine various types
of ethical climates (Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988). Although
this measure has been criticized for its inability to provide a
consistent factor structure, most research has used the ECQ. This
research has often found that an employee’s perception of the
organization’s focus is associated with unethical behavior and the
employee’s attitudes toward the organization (for a review, see
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Mayer, 2014).
A parallel stream is related to the notion of ethical culture.
In contrast to ethical climate, ethical culture focuses more on
the perceived formal and informal elements of an organizational
context that may be likely to encourage ethical conduct (Treviño
et al., 1998; Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz-Palomino and Martínez-Cañas,
2014). As was true for ethical climate, research on ethical culture
has consistently found that the perception of an ethical culture
among employees is, e.g., associated with more-favorable job
attitudes, ethical intentions and behavior (for a review, see
Mayer, 2014). In comparison to ethical climate, we believe
that the concept of ethical culture better allows interventions,
since it draws more directly on the conditions of (un)ethical
behavior. However, as Mayer (2014) pointed out, there is still
little consistency in not only the conceptualization but also the
measurement of ethical culture. While previous studies treated
ethical culture as a one-dimensional construct (Treviño et al.,
1998), Kaptein, for instance, conceptualized ethical culture as a
multi-dimensional construct. Drawing on a virtue-based theory
of business ethics, he developed the Corporate Ethical Virtues
questionnaire (CEV; Kaptein, 2008a, 2011), which was designed
to assess eight organizational virtues. These virtues are posited
to represent organizational conditions that may be likely to
stimulate employee ethical conduct.
Finally, there is a third prominent stream targeting corporate
ethical culture, which has received much attention from
scientific scholars and practitioners alike. Since Paine’s (1994)
groundbreaking article on how to manage organizational
standards, it has become an integral part of organizational
discussions on distinguishing between compliance and integrity.
Yet, the governance strategies associated with a compliance- or
integrity-based approach are quite different. The compliance-
oriented approach (also called the command-and-control
approach) is mainly designed to prevent violations through
control, detection and threats of punishment for misconduct.
The integrity-oriented approach (also called the value-oriented
or self-regulatory approach), on the other hand, combines a
concern for legal issues with the goal of supporting ethically
sound behavior through encouraging moral self-governance and
responsibility for shared values. In contrast to ethical climate
and ethical culture, the notions of compliance- and integrity-
oriented programs emphasize how to steer organizations toward
profitability while taking into account consistency with legal and
ethical standards (Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al.,
2014). Despite their varying characteristics, both ethics programs
represent organizational control systems that aim to encourage
rule adherence (Weaver and Treviño, 1999; Weaver et al., 1999;
Tyler and Blader, 2005).
There is no doubt that compliance- and integrity-based
ethics programs are currently the leading pragmatic approaches
to ethics used in the business environment (see e.g., OECD,
2009, for a recognition of this general trend in business, or
see Wieland et al., 2014, for acknowledging this trend in
Germany). Surprisingly, despite this dominance, it has not been
adopted in the (empirical) research on ethical culture. To our
knowledge, no sound measure assessing those components has
thus far been developed.
The purpose of this paper is to take first steps to address
this gap by developing a new measure. We believe that there
are several reasons that it is necessary to expand previous
scales. (1) The prior ethical climate/culture approaches do not
say a great deal about how to embed ethics in organizations
and managerial practice. Adopting the compliance and integrity
framework in a new measure thus complements prior work by
emphasizing more how to steer an organization. (2) Integrating
the compliance and integrity framework into a measure not only
better matches trends in practice but also offers an important
means to organizations, risk managers, compliance or ethics
officers of reflecting current states and progress in their firm.
It also allows comparing the utility of both approaches to
achieve adherence to rules and ethical standards. (3) A new
measure is also needed to be able to conduct rigorous empirical
research on the antecedents, consequences and effectiveness
of the applied governance strategies. Astonishingly, empirical
studies in this domain are thus far nearly absent. Most inferences
for organizations are, as far as we can see, mainly based on theory
and cased-based studies (e.g., Paine, 1994; Verhezen, 2010). As
rare exceptions, we mention Treviño et al. (1999), Weaver and
Treviño (1999), and Tyler and Blader (2005), who have provided
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first empirical evidence that integrity-based programs are likely to
make a unique contribution to predicting unethical behavior and
employee attitudes compared to programs that are solely based
on command and control. However, our knowledge about what
those various programs actually accomplish and how they affect
employee’s attitudes and ethical behavior is still severely limited.
Thus, developing a measure integrating this framework offers
opportunities to examine more thoroughly possible antecedents
and consequences of a compliance- and integrity-based culture
and the interplay of those programs. (4) A further reason
we decided to start developing a new measure was to better
account for essential findings from the field of behavioral ethics
and social psychology. In particular, behavioral ethics research
has, in recent years, provided many important insights about
organizational factors that can affect ethical behavior but which
have, as far as we can see, not been considered in prior ethical
culture measures.
Overall, we aim to develop a new scale that adopts both a
compliance and integrity orientation, representing two steering
strategies to implement ethics programs, and adopting features
of the organizational culture, which can inhibit or facilitate
the effectiveness of those governance strategies. Specifically, we
propose that to manage ethics, compliance- and integrity-based
programs should be supplemented by knowledge about features
of the organizational culture, which can inhibit or facilitate the
effectiveness of the governance strategies.
ADOPTING THE COMPLIANCE AND
INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above, compliance- or integrity-based programs
focus on different strategies for how to steer the organization.
However, while both compliance- and integrity-based
approaches share the same goal (behavior in accordance
with organizational rules and values), the procedures to steer
the organization are quite different. Whereas the former
emphasizes regulation through lawful rules, the latter emphasizes
regulation through values (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño,
1999; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al., 2014). Ethics
policies, however, whatever aim they have, have to rely on an
effective implementation. Obviously, there may be key features of
the organizational environment that can affect the effectiveness
of the policies. For example, an organization may attempt to
build on shared values such as honesty, fairness and respect;
however, the leaders in the firm may not “live” those values,
thereby potentially undermining the effectiveness and credibility
of the ethics program.
To implement effective ethics programs, board and managers
need therefore to know how members of an organization
perceive and evaluate the firm’s policies and activities; however,
it is also important that they have insights into factors of the
organizational context that may affect the effectiveness of the
firm’s strategies. The goal of the proposed German measure here
is to assess both (1) people’s belief about the extent to which an
organization relies on compliance and/or integrity governance
procedures and (2) people’s perception about the unwritten
but lived norms, expectations and behaviors. Consistent with
this goal, we define ethical culture as perceptions about the
governance strategies and the effectively implemented norms and
expectations that are shared by the members of the organization.
As mentioned earlier, we believe that adopting the compliance
and integrity distinction will, among other things, identify new
research questions that can advance our knowledge about the
consequences of ethical culture. This framework points to the
possibility that compliance- or integrity-oriented approaches,
despite sharing the same goal, may have different implications
for employee motivation, attitudes and behavior (see Stimmler
and Tanner, 2019, for developing various propositions). For
example, whereas compliance factors may likely be associated
with controlled motivation, integrity factors may likely foster
autonomous motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Indeed,
prompted by corporate scandals and the financial crisis,
compliance officers and risk managers have mainly implemented
compliance-based programs to prevent legal violations (Paine,
1994). Several authors have pointed out the necessity to
move beyond an exclusively compliance-based approach (Paine,
1994; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al., 2014).
For example, it is proposed that an integrity-oriented culture
may be more advantageous in managing misconduct, since it
builds on encouraging people’s intrinsic motivation to follow the
organizational standards. This suggestion is intuitively appealing,
but it still awaits empirical examination.
We also expand previous measures by including important
insights from the fields of behavioral ethics, social psychology
and organizational psychology into organizational factors that are
likely to be related to ethical behavior. Drawing on this research,
our measure will incorporate dimensions such as the role of
ill-conceived goals, accountability or pressure to compromise
(which will be detailed below). These dimensions have thus
far not been addressed in prior ethical culture measures.
With rule viability and rule defectiveness (which will also be
detailed below), we will adopt two new dimensions. We learned
from discussions with practitioners about those dimensions
allegedly representing two essential challenges of compliance
management. We continue by describing the German Ethical
Culture Scale (GECS).
BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE GECS
As is common in research on ethical climate or culture, we
measure employee perception of both formal elements (e.g., code
of ethics or availability of a hotline) and informal ones, since
their perception is the reality based upon employee reactions.
Building on the converging features of previous measures, we
also conceptualize ethical culture as a multi-dimensional concept.
The focus will be on dimensions that are proposed to match with
a compliance- or integrity-based strategy. As mentioned earlier,
the GECS will be designed to assess (1) people’s belief about
the extent to which an organization relies on compliance and
integrity governance strategies and (2) people’s perception about
the lived norms and expectations. These factors might inhibit or
promote the implementation of the strategies.
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Compliance Factors
A compliance-based approach to ethics management focuses
on preventing misconduct through control, monitoring and
punishment (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño, 1999). Such
procedures are based on classic economic theory that following
rules is a function of extrinsic costs and benefits associated
with questionable behavior (e.g., Sutherland, 1983; Tyler and
Blader, 2005). Such strategies are also implicitly based on the
assumption that people cannot be trusted and are ethically
incompetent, which is why external controls are inevitably to
prevent wrongdoing (Weaver and Treviño, 1999; Verhezen, 2010;
Webb, 2012). Building on past studies and converging elements
of previous measures, we propose the following five aspects to
reflect a compliance-based culture:
(1) Controlling and (2) Sanctioning reflect classic governance
procedures clearly associated with a compliance strategy.
Controlling is the degree to which people believe that they are
being monitored and that misconduct is likely to be detected.
Sanctioning refers to the extent to which people believe that
unethical conduct is not tolerated and will be punished. However,
for sanctions strategies to work, organizations must also be
willing to invest resources into monitoring behavior and make
detection of misconduct sufficiently likely. These two dimensions
are similar to previous ethical culture models, which have posited
that visibility and punishment of unethical behavior is likely
to inhibit unethical behavior (Treviño et al., 1998; Kaptein,
2008a). Empirical studies on the effects of supervision and
incentives on unethical behavior are, however, controversial.
Some studies suggest that command-and-control strategies do
affect undesirable behavior, whereas other studies question the
effectiveness of such strategies (see Tyler and Blader, 2005).
Furthermore, we propose three dimensions to reflect the
(in)effectiveness of rule-based compliance strategies. (3) Rule
clarity is the extent to which rules and expectations, as they are
often portrayed in codes of ethics or conduct, are sufficiently clear
and concrete to employees. This aspect is consistent with Kaptein
(2008a), who posited that ethical standards should be concrete,
comprehensible and understandable if employees and managers
are expected to follow them. Clear rules help to reduce ambiguity
and vagueness of ethical expectations, thereby supporting ethical
behavior in positive ways. Other authors also pointed out that, for
rules to become effective for influencing behavior, one important
precondition is that they are accessible, clearly communicated
and easy to understand (Schwartz, 2001; Stevens, 2008).
(4) Rule defectiveness is the extent to which employees believe
that there are ethical gray areas or other challenging situations
where corresponding guidelines are missing. According to
Jackson (2000), an issue that has been mainly neglected in
prior studies on ethics programs is how organizations deal with
“ethical gray areas,” i.e., decisions that do not overly attract ethical
condemnation but that nevertheless represent characteristic daily
work topics that may be considered as ethical issues (e.g., Should
I call in sick to have a day off? Should I do personal business
on company time? How should I deal with giving and receiving
gifts or ethical dilemmas?). Cross-cultural studies have usually
found differences between nations and companies concerning
which ethical gray areas are perceived as important and which
are adopted in the codes of ethics (see Jackson, 2000). It is
plausible to assume that a compliance program’s efficiency in
shaping behavior is limited if employees believe that important
ethical issues and daily challenges are not appropriately addressed
in the proposed rules. To render unethical behavior less likely,
employees must believe that they have some guidance when they
are faced with important ethical issues.
(5) Rule viability refers to the degree to which the company’s
rules are perceived to complicate and hinder daily work rather
than to provide support. Various authors have expressed concerns
that if codes and rules are not deemed relevant and useful for daily
work, they are less likely to be accepted and adopted for guiding
behavior (Schwartz, 2004; Bageac et al., 2011). An additional
aspect of rule viability that has thus far hardly been addressed in
prior studies is the issue of being faced with too many rules. This
aspect can also minimize the perceived usefulness of rules. In fact,
the most prominent response to scandals in business in general
and the last financial crisis in particular has been to revise laws
and to increase regulation. More rules may increase bureaucratic
demands, but they may also confuse and disenable employees,
limiting the effectiveness of compliance strategies.
Integrity Factors
An integrity-based approach to ethics management focuses on
promoting ethical behavior through encouraging self-governance
and responsibility (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño, 1999). Such
programs are based on the view that following rules is a function
of an individual’s intrinsic desire to follow organizational rules
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). Such strategies are also implicitly based
on the assumption that employees can be trusted and are prone
to follow ethical values. Hence, integrity-oriented approaches are
designed to support ethical aspirations and the identification with
and internalization of ethical standards (Weaver and Treviño,
1999; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012). We propose the following
aspects to reflect an integrity-based culture:
We deem (6) accountability and (7) leader’s role modeling to
reflect two essential governance procedures that are associated
with an integrity strategy. Accountability refers to the extent to
which people are clear about who is responsible for which tasks
and has to justify one’s actions to others. To our knowledge,
accountability has not been addressed in previous ethical cultural
models. The argument is, however, that if an organization
makes clear that its members are responsible for what they
do, this action can intrinsically motivate employees to feel a
personal responsibility and a desire to bring behavior in line
with corporate rules and ethical standards. We believe that, in
contrast, an organization lacking such a governance strategy is
more likely to encourage rationalization processes, such as denial
of responsibility (Anand et al., 2004).
It is important to acknowledge, however, that accountability
has at least three facets. We use the term “task accountability” to
refer to who is accountable for which tasks. Being a member of
an organization with a hierarchical structure or being involved
in teams and collective decision-making tasks is likely to provide
people with opportunities to free themselves from personal
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responsibility. Bandura (1990, 1999) called, e.g., passing the cause
of wrongdoing to others displacement of responsibility, and the
dispersion of tasks and blame across the members of a group
diffusion of responsibility. Consistent with past research in social
psychology and behavioral ethics, we refer to “outcome” and
“procedural accountability” when organizational members are
expected either to justify the results of their decisions (outcome)
or to justify how decisions were made (procedural). Empirical
studies have shown that accountability can encourage self-critical
and deliberate thinking (e.g., Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). The
studies by Pitesa and Thau (2013) are also noteworthy. They have
provided evidence that organizations holding their employees
accountable for their choice procedures (compared to holding
them accountable for performance outcomes) reduced agents’
propensity to behave in a self-serving, unethical manner. In other
words, employees should in practice be judged on not only the
basis of the achieved outcomes but also how those outcomes
were accomplished.
Leader’s role modeling refers to the extent to which employees
perceive their top management or direct supervisors as role
models for ethical conduct. Several authors have proposed ethical
leadership to be a crucial element of a value-based organization
that guides employee thought and action (see e.g., Treviño et al.,
1998; Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011; Wieland et al., 2014).
Leader’s behaviors do reflect the values of the organizational
culture. Therefore, managers and supervisors do play a crucial
role in setting the ethical tone in an organization and by living up
to the values. Furthermore, through a process of social learning
(Bandura, 1986), employees are likely to adopt the values and
behaviors of the managers.
Many empirical studies have shown that leaders being
perceived as ethical models is likely to affect followers’ ethical
intentions and behaviors in positive ways (e.g., Brown and
Treviño, 2006; Tanner et al., 2010; Ruiz et al., 2011; Ruiz-
Palomino and Linuesa-Langreo, 2018). Some authors treat role
modeling of top management and role modeling of supervisors
as two distinct categories that affect employees’ responses in
distinct ways (Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011). Both, however,
are expected to be negatively related to unethical behavior.
Furthermore, three dimensions are proposed to hinder
the effectiveness of integrity-based strategies. (8) Pressure to
compromise is the extent to which people experience role/value
conflicts and pressure from the organization to counter their own
sense of right and wrong. The sources of such pressures may be
job or role demands, authority figures or working teams that push
the employee in behavioral directions that are inconsistent with
ethical standards. Previous organizational, business or behavioral
ethics research suggests that employees who feel pressure to
behave counter to their conscience are likely to suffer from
stress and burnout (e.g., Örtqvist and Wincent, 2006; Eatough
et al., 2011; Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2012). A meta-analytic
study by Örtqvist and Wincent (2006) indicated that among
the most prominent consequences of role conflict were job
dissatisfaction, loss of organizational commitment and emotional
exhaustion. Another meta-analysis by Eatough et al. (2011) found
a negative relationship between role conflict and organizational
citizenship behavior (OCB).
It seems therefore plausible to assume that organizational
members’ believing that they are expected to compromise their
own values is likely to discourage intrinsic motivation to identify
with organizational values and to render unethical behavior more
likely. Consistent with this point, empirical studies have shown
that a mismatch between the expectations of the employees and
the organization is likely to not only lower job satisfaction but
also increase cheating (Burks and Krupka, 2012) or other forms
of unethical behavior (Suar and Khuntia, 2010).
(9) Obedience refers to the extent to which people believe
that they are expected to be subordinate, keeping authorities
and tasks unquestioned (Treviño et al., 1999). Such expectations
are likely to enforce a culture of fear and silence rather than
a culture of voice (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Kish-Gephart
et al., 2009). While research has suggested multiple factors that
can affect the choice to remain silent or to speak up (for an
overview, see Morrison, 2014), one common explanation for
why people hesitate to speak up is related to fear. Kish-Gephart
et al. (2009) found across several studies that a substantial
number of respondents reported remaining silent out of fear of
experiencing negative personal, social or material consequences.
If organization members feel uncomfortable to speak up, such
people hardly feel encouraged to practice self-regulation and
moral responsibility. In contrast, in such an environment, people
may feel not committed and willing to adhere to corporate
rules and standards. They may also be likely to withhold input
about questionable practices (Snell, 1999; Miceli et al., 2008;
Detert et al., 2010). Consistent with this reasoning, Kaptein
(2011), for example, found that the opportunity for employees
to raise concerns and discuss ethical issues is associated with less-
unethical behavior. Additionally, Treviño et al. (1999) found that
employees perceiving a structure that expects obedience from
them were less willing to report ethical or legal violations or to
forward bad news to management.
(10) Ill-conceived goals are the extent to which the organization
is seen as mainly relying on competitive and economic goals
(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). Thus far, prior ethical culture
models have not addressed this issue. A growing body of
research in the field of behavioral ethics, however, has shown
that despite the beneficial role of goals in increasing achievement
motivation and productivity, goals can also lead to undesirable
side effects by encouraging unethical behavior. Indeed, empirical
research has demonstrated that people facing competitive or too
challenging (also stretch) goals (Barsky, 2008) are more likely
to exhibit cheating (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2004; Schwieren and
Weichselbaumer, 2010; Welsh and Ordóñez, 2014) and lower
intrinsic work motivation (Ordóñez et al., 2009). Similarly, Van
Yperen et al. (2011) have shown that interpersonal achievement
goals (that emphasize competition among colleagues) are more
likely than are intrapersonal goals (that emphasize mastering
a task) to increase cheating. Thus, the argument here is
that too challenging, competitive goals hardly support the
development of moral responsibility, thereby making unethical
behavior more likely.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of integrity-oriented programs
may also be undermined by an organization focusing only
on economic or self-interested goals in the workplace while
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not questioning its compatibility with ethical aspirations.
For example, an organization may attempt to build on
integrity and ethical values, but employees may nevertheless
perceive their organizational environment as emphasizing only
economic and egoistic goals. Consistent with this point, Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010) found meta-analytic evidence for a
positive relationship between an egoistic ethical climate and
unethical behavior.
Thus, acknowledging the importance of the role of goal-
setting, this dimension was also included in our instrument.
However, as with the dimension accountability, we distinguish
between various facets of ill-conceived goals. Acknowledging
this literature, we distinguish between goal-setting with regard
to its focus on “competition” and with regard to its focus
on “economic” goals. An ethical culture mainly focusing
on competition and economic goals is expected to be less
likely to promote responsibility and adherence to ethical
standards and behavior.
OVERVIEW OF SAMPLES AND STUDIES
The primary objective of the following studies was to develop
and assess the validity of the GECS. For the following studies,
data from three independent and heterogeneous samples of
employees and managers in Switzerland and Germany were used.
To test the questionnaire, it was important to us to have a
broad sample of employees and managers from various economic
sectors and from various hierarchical levels. Participants were
therefore recruited from panels of participants of market research
agencies. All data were collected through online surveys. Samples
A and B were used to develop the instrument and to perform
an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor
analyses (CFAs) to provide first evidence for the construct
validity of the measure. Sample B was also used to assess the
criterion related and incremental validity by testing its relation
to (observed) deviant workplace behaviors, based on regression
analyses. Finally, Sample C was used to take first steps to provide
evidence of the convergent validity of the GECS. The studies
were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the
Zeppelin University and the Swiss Psychological Society. The
samples are briefly described below. Table 1 reports further
work-related characteristics.
Sample A: This sample consisted of 300 (German-speaking)
Swiss employees and managers working in divers economic
sectors. Of these respondents, 36.3% were female, and mean age
was 42.6 years (SD = 12.6, range: 16–72 years).
Sample B: This sample consisted of 990 German employees
and managers, after 17 participants had to be excluded from the
analysis because of a lack of variation in their answering pattern.
Of these respondents, 46.6% were female, and mean age was
44.6 years (SD = 11.23, range: 21–74 years).
Sample C: This sample consisted of 493 German and 498
Swiss participants (total N = 991), after exclusion of nine
participants due to a lack of variation in their answering pattern.
Of this sample, 46.1% were female, and mean age was 44.4 years
(SD = 12.81, age range: 16–75 years).
TABLE 1 | Further work-related descriptive statistics of Samples A, B, and C.
Sample A
(N = 300)
Sample B
(N = 990)
Sample C
(N = 991)
Country Switzerland Germany Switzerland/
Germany
Employment
Full-time 91.7% 72.9% 66.7%
Part-time 5.7% 27.1% 33.3%
Job position
Non-Management Level 54.3% 58.4% 65.9%
Lower management 17.0% 17.8% 15.0%
Middle management 13.7% 17.7% 12.7%
Upper management 15.0% 6.2% 6.3%
Tenure (in current organization)
<1 year 9.3% 0.3% 1.1%
1–2 years 16.3% 15.8% 25.6%
3–5 years 21.0% 22.3% 21.1%
6–10 years 19.7% 20.4% 18.5%
>10 years 33.7% 41.2% 33.6%
Company size
<50 employees 32.0% 28.1% 29.4%
50–249 employees 23.3% 20.2% 22.5%
250–10,000 employees 32.7% 36.8% 36.7%
>10,000 employees 12.0% 14.9% 11.4%
Economic Sector
Agriculture and Energy 3.7% 2.0% 1.3%
Industry 28.0% 18.5% 17.3%
Services 57.7% 71.1% 73.3%
Others 10.7% 8.4% 8.1%
In sample A, 2.6% of participants were currently unemployed but worked in an
organization in the past 2 years for at least 9 months.
In the following, we present the development of the GECS,
its factorial structure and psychometric properties (Study 1a, 1b).
We then present results on the criterion-related and incremental
validity (Study 2) and tests on construct validity with external
constructs (Study 3).
Study 1a – Initial Development of
Instrument
In a first preliminary step, an initial pool of items was generated
based on the definition of the dimensions proposed to be
related to compliance and integrity, as explained in the previous
section. We first created items to assess the following constructs:
controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness, and
rule viability (proposed to represent compliance factors) and
accountability, role modeling of top management, role modeling
of supervisors, pressure to compromise, obedience, and ill-
conceived goals (proposed to represent integrity factors).
Our aim was to develop simple items that avoid, as often
as possible, terms such as “ethical” or “moral.” Examination of
previous instruments revealed that they often include items that
may be somewhat precarious, since they utilize the word “ethical”
in the wording. Such items, however, may be problematic since
they require from the respondents an understanding of what
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characterizes ethical or responsible conduct, which is often
not self-evident. We tried to avoid this shortcoming whenever
possible for this reason and also as an attempt to minimize
socially desirable responses.
Furthermore, our intention was ultimately to have a relatively
short but sound inventory. Of course, the generally accepted
argument is that longer instruments tend to have better
psychometric properties than shorter ones do (Gosling et al.,
2003). However, researchers are often faced with the problem
that time is limited and employees or managers are simply
not willing to fill out lengthy questionnaires. In such cases
(as is true in our research domain), practicable and efficient
measures are necessary. We therefore sought to have a minimum
of three items for each subscale. For accountability and ill-
conceived goals, since they contain nuanced facets, we wished
to have a minimum of six items (accountability with its
facets task, outcome and procedural accountability) and four
items (ill-conceived goals with its facets competition and
economic goals).
To this end, 34 items were developed by us, and 27 items were
adapted from prior instruments (e.g., Treviño et al., 1998; Brown
et al., 2005; Kaptein, 2008a). The items were then discussed with
three doctoral candidates experienced with the field. Based on
their inputs, items were reworded. An initial pool of 61 items
was then subjected to a first EFA (principle axis factor analysis,
promax rotation) with data collected from Sample A (N = 300).
Participants rated each item using a 5-point Likert-style format
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including the response
option no answer is applicable.
Based on this EFA, we removed 23 items with loadings lower
than 0.45 on one factor and cross-loadings higher than loadings
of 0.30. Rerunning the EFA with the remaining 38 items resulted
in nine factors (eigenvalues > 1). However, recognizing that
several subscales were insufficiently represented, we repeated the
item-generation and item-selection process in Study 1B.
Study 1b – Instrument Refinement and
Factor Analyses
We conducted a second iteration of instrument development.
Using EFA, we examined the scale’s factorial structure and
psychometric properties with data collected from Sample B
(N = 990). The goal of Study 1B was also to assess the robustness
of the proposed factor structure by conducting CFAs across
Sample B and Sample C (N = 991).
Measure
In addition to the remaining items from Study 1a (38 items),
new items were created in this second iteration. We added
more items to those constructs, which were suggested to have
nuanced facets (accountability, ill-conceived goals) (plus 15
items), and we also created some new items in the remaining
scales (4 items) just to be on the safe side when subjecting the
items to new analyses. In this stage, we also discussed content
and comprehensiveness of the items with three business ethics
scholars and three specialists with significant practical expertise
in ethics management. Especially from the practitioners, we
learned about rule viability and rule defectiveness as representing
two essential challenges in the managerial practice of compliance
management, which we consequently also included in our item
pool (plus 10 items). Based on the input of those external experts,
items were adapted, resulting in a final pool of 67 items.
The items describe concepts related to compliance
(controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness,
and rule viability) and integrity (accountability, role modeling
of top management, role modeling of direct supervisor, pressure
to compromise, obedience, and ill-conceived goals). Again,
participants rated each item on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 5 = strongly agree), including the response option
no answer is applicable. The items of the final instrument (37
items) – the original German items and the English translation
(based on Brislin, 1976) – can be found in the Supplementary
Table 1. Sample items include the following (English translation):
“In my work environment, measures are carried out to detect
rule violations and misconduct” (controlling); “In my work
environment, people who engage in dishonest behavior are
disciplined” (sanction); “My organization makes it sufficiently
clear to me which behaviors are right or wrong” (rule clarity);
“Some of the organization’s rules are intentionally not or
vaguely defined” (rule defectiveness); “The organization’s code
of conduct makes everything complicated” (rule viability);
“In my workplace, how goals are achieved also plays a role”
(accountability); “My direct supervisor is a good model of
integrity” (role modeling of direct supervisor); “In my work
environment, I am sometimes asked to do things that are in
conflict with my conscience” (pressure to compromise); “I
am expected to do what I am told” (obedience); and “In my
workplace, I can only make a career by outperforming others”
(ill-conceived goals).
Results
Building on the data from Sample B, the initial item analyses
revealed no peculiarities. The pool of 67 items was then
again subjected to an EFA (principal component analysis,
promax rotation).
We removed items with factor loadings less than 0.45 on
one factor and cross-loadings higher than loadings of 0.30.
These changes ultimately resulted in an instrument of 37
items (see Supplementary Table 1). Rerunning the EFA on
this instrument reduced the 37-item measures to 10 distinct
factors (eigenvalues > 1.0) corresponding to controlling (three
items), sanctioning (three items), rule clarity (three items),
rule defectiveness (three items), rule viability (three items),
accountability (six items), pressure to compromise (four items),
obedience (three items), and ill-conceived goals (four items).
Role modeling of top management and role modeling of direct
supervisors were not revealed as two separate factors. They were
therefore combined into one leader’s role modeling factor (five
items). All factors accounted for 72.07% of the variance. The
factor loadings are reported in Table 2.
Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, internal
consistencies (Cronbach’s alphas), and intercorrelations among
the subscales. The subscales in this table were calculated by
averaging the corresponding item scores. As shown, each scale
showed good internal consistency (αs between 0.72 and 0.91).
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TABLE 2 | EFA factor loadings and CFA standardized factor loadings (Study 1b).
Factor loadings
PCA CFA
(Sample B) (Sample B and C)
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 λ B λC
Controlling 1 0.09 0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.07 0.07 −0.07 −0.08 0.92 0.81 0.80
Controlling 2 −0.01 −0.06 0.02 0.04 −0.06 −0.03 0.06 −0.04 0.13 0.91 0.85 0.85
Controlling 3 −0.10 0.10 −0.02 −0.03 0.22 0.16 −0.20 0.27 −0.08 0.48 0.48 0.59
Sanctioning 1 −0.05 0.05 0.00 −0.03 −0.07 −0.03 0.04 0.94 −0.07 −0.02 0.78 0.80
Sanctioning 2 0.01 −0.07 −0.04 −0.01 −0.06 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.08 0.01 0.83 0.73
Sanctioning 3 0.19 −0.15 −0.02 0.17 0.05 −0.05 0.06 0.54 0.10 −0.08 0.55 0.58
Rule Clarity 1 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.92 0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.91 0.88
Rule Clarity 2 −0.05 0.05 0.03 0.89 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.83 0.88
Rule Clarity 3 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.04 −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.86 0.82
Rule Defectiveness 1 −0.08 −0.04 0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.02 0.85 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.83 0.79
Rule Defectiveness 2 −0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.82 −0.02 −0.03 0.03 0.88 0.88
Rule Defectiveness 3 0.02 0.18 −0.01 0.02 0.07 −0.04 0.78 0.10 −0.10 0.01 0.73 0.70
Rule Viability 1 0.10 −0.09 0.00 0.01 −0.05 0.96 −0.04 −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.72 0.69
Rule Viability 2 0.07 0.06 0.04 −0.04 −0.03 0.87 0.05 0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.88 0.90
Rule Viability 3 0.04 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.07 0.81 0.09 −0.05 0.09 −0.06 0.87 0.82
Accountability 1 −0.13 −0.07 0.87 −0.02 0.10 0.11 −0.05 −0.02 −0.12 −0.02 0.67 0.82
Accountability 2 −0.01 −0.06 0.83 −0.05 0.02 0.06 0.07 −0.01 0.10 −0.01 0.64 0.74
Accountability 3 0.10 0.09 0.74 0.02 −0.16 −0.10 0.08 −0.12 −0.01 −0.02 0.68 0.74
Accountability 4 0.11 −0.05 0.66 0.01 0.02 −0.14 −0.02 −0.01 0.07 −0.03 0.74 0.77
Accountability 5 −0.04 −0.04 0.60 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.13 −0.13 0.07 0.61 0.55
Accountability 6 0.11 0.07 0.56 0.05 −0.05 −0.12 −0.15 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.66 0.64
Role Modeling 1 0.96 0.00 −0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 −0.04 −0.06 0.00 0.03 0.94 0.92
Role Modeling 2 0.95 0.00 −0.06 0.08 0.03 0.11 −0.02 −0.08 −0.05 0.02 0.90 0.86
Role Modeling 3 0.94 −0.01 −0.05 0.04 0.09 0.10 −0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.91
Role Modeling 4 0.68 0.09 0.16 −0.13 0.02 −0.10 −0.03 0.14 −0.04 −0.01 0.67 0.68
Role Modeling 5 0.65 0.10 0.16 −0.09 −0.10 −0.03 0.03 0.15 −0.02 −0.01 0.62 0.67
Pressure To Compromise 1 0.04 0.92 −0.02 0.02 −0.07 −0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.06 0.03 0.87 0.87
Pressure To Compromise 2 0.07 0.89 −0.05 0.04 0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.06 −0.01 0.86 0.85
Pressure To Compromise 3 0.05 0.86 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 −0.04 0.03 −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.81 0.76
Pressure To Compromise 4 −0.04 0.81 0.04 −0.05 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.00 −0.05 0.87 0.87
Obedience 1 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.05 −0.03 0.01 0.89 0.00 0.77 0.81
Obedience 2 −0.10 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.90 0.91
Obedience 3 −0.13 0.17 −0.01 −0.09 0.13 0.08 −0.04 0.04 0.54 0.02 0.72 0.84
Ill-Conceived Goals 1 0.01 −0.20 0.02 −0.04 0.86 −0.06 0.07 −0.07 0.14 0.04 0.63 0.63
Ill-Conceived Goals 2 0.26 −0.07 −0.05 −0.08 0.85 −0.17 0.14 −0.03 0.07 −0.03 0.56 0.53
Ill-Conceived Goals 3 −0.09 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.66 0.07 0.01 −0.01 −0.10 −0.05 0.76 0.85
Ill-Conceived Goals 4 −0.11 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.65 0.05 −0.14 −0.02 −0.11 −0.04 0.76 0.85
Factors: 1 = Leader’s Role Modeling, 2 = Pressure to Compromise, 3 = Accountability, 4 = Rule Clarity, 5 = Ill-Conceived Goals, 6 = Rule Viability, 7 = Rule Defectiveness,
8 = Sanctioning, 9 = Obedience, 10 = Controlling; λ = standardized factor loadings of the CFA (Model C with 10 first-order factors and correlated error terms for role
modeling of top management items).
The GECS with the final item set (37 items) was then sent
online to Sample C. We next tested robustness of the proposed
model by conducting a series of CFAs across Samples B and
C. CFAs were performed using AMOS 22 maximum likelihood
estimation of covariance. The answer no answer is applicable
was coded as missing values; hence, we were allowed to estimate
means and intercepts.
Five models were estimated and compared: Model A with one
factor, Model B with two factors (compliance and integrity) and
Model C with the proposed 10 factors. With Models D and E,
we also examined whether the 10 factors can be summarized
into higher-order factors. In the theory section, we proposed
that compliance and integrity would converge at two higher-
order constructs (controlling, sanctioning, clarity, defectiveness
and viability of rules should load onto a compliance factor;
accountability, leader’s role modeling, pressure to compromise,
obedience, ill-conceived goals should load onto an integrity
factor, Model E). We compared this Model E with the
alternative Model D (10 factors loading on one higher-
order construct).
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TABLE 3 | Correlation matrix of the GECS factors, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas (Sample B, Study 1b).
M (SD) α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Controlling 3.43 (0.90) 0.72
(2) Sanctioning 3.47 (0.88) 0.74 0.46∗∗∗
(3) Rule clarity 3.99 (0.91) 0.90 0.39∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(4) Rule defectiveness 2.71 (1.08) 0.85 −0.04 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(5) Rule viability 2.73 (1.08) 0.86 −0.01 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(6) Accountability 3.59 (0.73) 0.83 0.36∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(7) Leader’s role modeling 3.43 (1.01) 0.91 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(8) Pressure to compromise 2.38 (1.09) 0.91 −0.01 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(9) Obedience 2.95 (1.00) 0.83 0.02 −0.06 −0.09∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(10) Ill-conceived goals 2.81 (0.91) 0.77 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.03 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
To assess the model fit, the chi-square (χ2/df ), comparative
fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI) and root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) were used. According to
previous studies, it is suggested that χ2/df should be equal to or
less than 3 or at least less than 5. For CFI and TLI, values above
0.90 are regarded as acceptable, and values close to or greater
than 0.95 are regarded as good fit. For RMSEA, values equal to
or less than 0.07 indicate a good fit. To compare the models, we
used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), with smaller values
indicating a better-fitting model (see, e.g., Wheaton et al., 1977;
Hooper et al., 2008).
An examination of modification indices revealed high error
covariance between the two top management role-modeling
items in Models C, D, and E. When the two error terms were
free to correlate, the fit was clearly improved. Importantly,
this modification also makes theoretical sense because prior
research suggested that role modeling of top management and
role modeling of supervisors are two distinct constructs (Kaptein,
2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011).
Table 4 displays the fit statistics of the models. The results
repeatedly revealed across all samples that the ten-factor solution
(Model C) fit the data better than did the one- or two-factor
solution (Models A and B), which was also confirmed by χ2-
difference tests between the three nested first-order models.
Based on the criteria, all fit indices indicated a good or acceptable
fit for the 10-factor model. The same applies to the two
second-order models (D and E), with the exception of CFI and
TLI, which were marginally below the recommended criteria.
Comparing the two second-order factor models, χ2-difference
tests pointed to Model E (with two second-order factors: Integrity
and Compliance) fitting the data better than did Model D (with
one second-order factor: Ethical Culture). Testing the robustness
of our Models C, D, and E separately for the Swiss and German
respondents of Sample C also yielded very similar results for
both countries. Overall, the results largely supported the 10-factor
solution but also deemed second-order factors acceptable. CFA
standardized factor loadings of the 10-factor model (Model C)
are reported in Table 2.
We examined convergent validity of the 10 factors by assessing
average variance extracted (AVE) in the CFAs (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2014). The results are reported in
Table 5. With regard to AVE, the analyses revealed that most
constructs were greater than 0.50, as recommended (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). Just for accountability (AVE = 0.45) and ill-
conceived goals (AVE = 0.46), but only in Sample B, the criterion
was not met. We assume that the reason the AVE of those
factors is below the recommended threshold is that accountability
and ill-conceived goals may be more heterogeneous in content.
However, with data from Sample C, the criterion of 0.5 was met
for all constructs.
We also examined divergent validity by AVE. Adequate
divergent validity is given when the square root of the variance
extracted from each of the factors is greater than the correlations
between each pair of factors (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As
shown in Table 5, all factors satisfy this condition with data from
both Samples B and C.
Study 2 – Criterion-Related and
Incremental Validity
To establish criterion-related validity, the association between the
GECS and deviant workplace behavior was considered with data
from Sample B. To minimize potential social desirability bias, we
administered observed and not self-reported deviant workplace
behavior (which is assumed to be more susceptible to socially
desirable responding and impression management), and we used
different response formats to assess the predictor and criterion
variables. Specifically, we expected controlling, sanctioning, rule
clarity, accountability, and leader’s role modeling to be associated
with less observed deviant workplace behavior. We expected
rule defectiveness, rule viability, pressure to compromise,
obedience, and ill-conceived goals to be associated with more
observed misconduct.
Several authors have argued that to align employee’s behavior
with ethical standards, it is important to move beyond
compliance-oriented strategies, since control and punishment
may prevent wrongdoing, but they do not necessarily change
convictions (e.g., Paine, 1994; Tyler and Blader, 2005). Integrity-
based strategies, on the other hand, encourage personal
commitment to ethical aspirations, thereby being more successful
in affecting behavior (e.g., Weaver and Treviño, 1999). If so,
we should be able to find that integrity factors will account for
variance increments over and above the compliance factors.
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TABLE 4 | Goodness-of-Fit Indices of CFA models (Study 1b).
Model χ2(df) χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA AIC χ2 difference tests
1χ2 1 df
Sample B (N = 990)
A: 1 factor (Ethical Culture) 13736.22 (629)∗∗∗ 21.84 0.39 0.36 0.15 13958.22 A–C 11897.49∗∗∗ 46
B: 2 factors (Integrity, Compliance) 12485.15 (628)∗∗∗ 19.88 0.43 0.36 0.14 12709.15 B–C 10646.42∗∗∗ 45
C: 10 factorsa 1838.73 (583)∗∗∗ 3.15 0.94 0.93 0.05 2152.73
D: 10 first ordera, 1 second-order factor (EC) 3015.02 (618)∗∗∗ 4.88 0.89 0.87 0.06 3259.02 D–E 32.58∗∗∗ 1
E: 10 first ordera, 2 second-order factors 2982.44 (617)∗∗∗ 4.83 0.89 0.87 0.06 3228.44
(Integrity, Compliance)
Sample C (N = 991)
A: 1 factor (Ethical Culture) 13025.28 (629)∗∗∗ 20.71 0.42 0.35 0.14 13247.28 A–C 11153.60∗∗∗ 46
B: 2 factors (Integrity, Compliance) 11896.09 (628)∗∗∗ 18.94 0.47 0.41 0.14 12120.09 B–C 10024.41∗∗∗ 45
C: 10 factorsa 1871.68 (583)∗∗∗ 3.21 0.94 0.93 0.05 2185.68
D: 10 first ordera, 1 second-order factor (EC) 3001.54 (618)∗∗∗ 4.86 0.89 0.87 0.06 3245.54 D–E 7.07∗∗ 1
E: 10 first ordera, 2 second-order factors 2994.47 (617)∗∗∗ 4.85 0.89 0.87 0.06 3240.47
(Integrity, Compliance)
EC, Ethical Culture. In models C, D, and E, the error terms for the two-role modeling of top management items were allowed to correlate. aThe 10 factors are as
follows: controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness, rule viability, accountability, leader’s role modeling, pressure to compromise, obedience, ill-conceived
goals. ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 | Convergent and discriminant validity of the 10-Factor Model (Model C) (Study 1b).
Latent constructs AVE Square root of AVE Latent construct correlation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sample B (N = 990)
(1) Controlling 0.54 0.73
(2) Sanctioning 0.53 0.73 0.52
(3) Rule clarity 0.75 0.87 0.44 0.48
(4) Rule defectiveness 0.66 0.81 −0.11 −0.16 −0.27
(5) Rule viability 0.68 0.83 −0.10 −0.15 −0.19 0.58
(6) Accountability 0.45 0.67 0.44 0.54 0.50 −0.29 −0.35
(7) Leader’s role modeling 0.66 0.81 0.33 0.41 0.38 −0.34 −0.29 0.63
(8) Pressure to compromise 0.73 0.85 −0.09 −0.10 −0.18 0.63 0.57 −0.24 −0.36
(9) Obedience 0.64 0.80 −0.02 −0.04 −0.07 0.43 0.48 −0.23 −0.40 0.64
(10) Ill-conceived goals 0.46 0.68 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.43 0.43 −0.03 −0.17 0.62 0.55
Sample C (N = 991)
(1) Controlling 0.56 0.75
(2) Sanctioning 0.50 0.71 0.62
(3) Rule clarity 0.74 0.86 0.50 0.58
(4) Rule defectiveness 0.63 0.79 −0.06 −0.17 −0.30
(5) Rule viability 0.65 0.81 0.08 −0.07 −0.14 0.48
(6) Accountability 0.51 0.71 0.33 0.47 0.48 −0.39 −0.39
(7) Leader’s role modeling 0.67 0.82 0.30 0.36 0.40 −0.37 −0.34 0.63
(8) Pressure to compromise 0.70 0.84 0.01 −0.17 −0.23 0.59 0.52 −0.39 −0.47
(9) Obedience 0.72 0.85 0.07 −0.07 −0.05 0.35 0.43 −0.35 −0.40 0.57
(10) Ill-conceived goals 0.53 0.73 0.20 0.13 0.03 0.33 0.43 −0.20 −0.27 0.53 0.50
AVE, average variance extracted.
Measures
Observed deviant workplace behavior
Beyond the GECS, participants were also asked to report
observed misconduct in the workplace. Drawing on a German
version of Kaptein’s (2008b) scale of observer-reports of unethical
behavior (Kaptein, 2011; Zuber and Kaptein, 2014), participants
were asked how often in the past 12 months they had observed
or had first-hand knowledge of intra- or extra-organizational
deviant behaviors in their work environment (e.g., discriminating
against others due to age, gender, or sexual orientation; violating
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contracts or lawful rules; misleading others; or stealing; 19 items).
Consistent with Kaptein (2008b, 2011) and Zuber and Kaptein
(2014), responses were given on a 5-point frequency scale (never,
rarely, sometimes, often, almost always), including the response
option no answer is applicable.
Formal factors of ethics programs
Participants were also asked about the availability of formal
codes or other forms of internal formal ethics programs in their
organization, such as the existence of a code of ethics, ethical
training, a telephone hotline, availability of ethics officers, formal
ethics controls or an ethics report (adapted from Kaptein, 2014).
Possible answers were yes, no, and not applicable.
Results
To assess criterion-related and incremental validity, correlation
and regression analyses were conducted to examine the relation
between the GECS dimensions and the dependent variable
(observed deviant workplace behavior). As mentioned above,
the observer-based reports on deviant workplace behaviors were
assessed using a 5-point frequency scale. Though such scales
are widely used in social sciences, we decided to dichotomize
the response scale, partly because of its skewness and kurtosis
but mainly because we can hardly expect participants to have a
common understanding of “rarely, sometimes, and often.” The
linguistic meaning of those frequency expressions is too vague.
Consistent with this reasoning is Bocklisch et al. (2012), who
showed that the positions and shape of participant response
patterns varied considerably and that frequency expressions
such as “rarely, sometimes, often” were hardly equidistantly
distributed. Dichotomizing reduces this linguistic vagueness. We
first dichotomized each item (0 indicates that the corresponding
behavior was never observed; 1 indicates that this behavior was
observed at least rarely; see also Zuber and Kaptein, 2014).
Calculating the sum across all items then yielded the number
of situations across which misconduct was observed (ranging
from 0 to 19). This variable served as a criterion variable in the
regression analyses.
The results of the bivariate correlations and hierarchical
regression analyses are depicted in Table 6. The bivariate
correlations between the ten dimensions composing the GECS
and the deviant workplace behavior scale were all significant
(ps < 0.01) and in expected directions (see Table 6, last
column). Using regression analyses, we then tested how strongly
sociodemographic variables (step 1), formal factors of ethics
programs (step 2), compliance factors (step 3) and integrity
factors (step 4) contribute to the variance in the outcome
variable deviant workplace behavior. As scores for the GECS
dimensions, we entered the factor scores of the PCA. As shown
in Table 6, entering the formal factors (step 2) following the
sociodemographic variables (step 1) increased the accounting for
predicted variance from 3 to 6%. Entering the compliance factors
of the GECS further increased the explained variance from 6 to
33%. However, entering the integrity factors again increased the
explained variance from 33 to 48%. Thus, the results provide
evidence for the incremental validity of the GECS over and above
formal factors, but they also support the view that the integrity
factors contribute to predicting observed misconduct even above
the compliance factors.
Though not shown in the table, we also conducted an
analysis using only the integrity factors (after entering the
sociodemographic variables and ethics programs factors) to
better compare the overall utility of the compliance versus
integrity factors in predicting the criterion variable. This model
explained 46% of the variance in deviant workplace behavior,
while the model with the compliance factors, as mentioned above,
explained 33% of the variance. These results further confirm that
the utility of the compliance approach is relevant but somewhat
weaker than that of an integrity- or value-oriented approach.
Overall, the final analysis revealed that 6 of 10 dimensions of
the GECS were significant predictors of the extent of observed
misconduct (ps < 0.05). The significant positive relations
indicated that, as expected, participants reporting higher levels
of rule defectiveness, rule viability, pressure to compromise, or
ill-conceived goals were likely to observe more misconduct. The
significant negative relations indicated that participants reporting
higher levels of controlling or of accountability were likely to
report less misconduct at work.
Study 3 – Construct Validity
Data from Sample C (N = 991) were used to provide further
evidence of the measure’s construct validity by comparing the
GECS with other established measures of related constructs. We
examined convergent validity by examining the relations between
the composite measures of compliance and integrity factors and
theoretically related constructs. As previous authors suggested
that an integrity-based culture is more focused on enabling
self-governance and personal commitment (e.g., Paine, 1994;
Verhezen, 2010; Wieland et al., 2014), we expected integrity-
based factors to correlate positively with autonomous motivation
and negatively with controlled motivation. In contrast, given that
a compliance-based culture is proposed to be more focused
on controlling people, we hypothesized that compliance-based
factors of the GECS would correlate positively with controlled
but negatively with autonomous motivation. To assess those
relations, we included a well-known work motivation measure
(Gagné and Deci, 2005).
Furthermore, we included a measure of duty orientation
reflecting people’s volitional obligation to perform organizational
tasks, groups and missions (Hannah et al., 2014). This
scale was originally developed in the context of active
army soldiers but later also employed with government
and corporate employees. This scale is interesting for us
to examine construct validity, since it distinguishes between
adherence to normative codes and rules (duty to code),
the willingness to support and serve one’s group and its
members (duty to members), and the willingness to support
the purpose of the group and to make personal sacrifices
(duty to mission). We expected both integrity and compliance-
oriented factors of organizations to be positively related to duty
orientation, since the purpose of both GECS components is
ultimately to ensure employees’ consistency with organizational
codes and standards. However, since compliance-oriented
programs are more focused on compliance with rules, we
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TABLE 6 | Results on hierarchical regressions and correlations with deviant workplace behavior (Sample B, Study 2).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
β SE β SE β SE β SE r
Sociodemographics
Female 0.04 0.68 0.03 0.67 0.01 0.57 0.03 0.50 −0.07∗
Age −0.05 0.03 −0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 −0.12∗∗∗
Job position 0.11∗ 0.31 0.13∗∗ 0.31 0.11∗ 0.26 0.10∗ 0.24 0.16∗∗∗
Years in company −0.10 0.04 −0.08 0.04 −0.02 0.03 −0.02 0.03 −0.02
Size of the company 0.17∗∗∗ 0.33 0.19∗∗∗ 0.34 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.27 0.06
Formal factors
Ethics code −0.02 0.73 0.02 0.62 0.04 0.55 −0.02
Ethics training 0.03 0.84 −0.01 0.71 0.06 0.63 0.00
Telephone hotline −0.22∗∗∗ 0.77 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.66 −0.12∗∗ 0.58 −0.07∗
Ethics office 0.10 0.93 0.10 0.79 0.07 0.70 0.07
Ethics control −0.09 0.81 −0.03 0.72 −0.06 0.63 −0.02
Ethics report 0.10 1.01 0.10 0.86 0.04 0.77 0.11∗∗
GECS – Compliance
Controlling −0.13∗∗ 0.30 −0.10∗ 0.27 −0.17∗∗∗
Sanctioning 0.02 0.31 0.03 0.29 −0.10∗∗
Rule clarity −0.12∗ 0.29 −0.07 0.26 −0.28∗∗∗
Rule defectiveness 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28 0.10∗ 0.27 0.43∗∗∗
Rule viability 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29 0.10∗ 0.29 0.41∗∗∗
GECS – Integrity
Accountability −0.16∗∗ 0.31 −0.29∗∗∗
Leader’s role modeling 0.01 0.30 −0.36∗∗∗
Pressure to compromise 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30 0.58∗∗∗
Obedience 0.04 0.28 0.33∗∗∗
Ill-conceived goals 0.11∗ 0.28 0.36∗∗∗
Adj. R2 (1R2) 0.03 0.06 (0.03) 0.33 (0.27) 0.48 (0.15)
F (1F ) 3.71∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ (3.25∗∗) 14.57∗∗∗ (35.78∗∗∗) 20.51∗∗∗ (25.92∗∗∗)
Dependent variable: sum of observed deviant workplace behaviors; 1R2 and 1F refer to a change in R2 and F statistics; Max. VIF refers to the largest variance inflation
factor. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
also expected compliance factors to reveal somewhat higher
positive correlations with duty to codes than would integrity
factors. In contrast, as integrity-oriented programs are more
focused on encouraging intrinsic, motivated commitment to
standards, we expected integrity factors to reveal higher positive
correlations with duty to members and mission than would
compliance factors.
Measures
Work motivation
Beyond the GECS, a German version of the Multidimensional
Work Motivation scale (Gagné et al., 2015) was administered.
This measure assesses five distinct types of motivation along a
continuum from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation. These types are
combined into one category representing controlled motivation
(11 items, e.g., “I am involved in my job, because others
put pressure on me,” α = 0.85) and another one representing
autonomous motivation (6 items, e.g., “I am involved in my job,
because what I do in this job has a lot of personal meaning to me.”,
α = 0.92). Items were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Duty orientation
Duty orientation was assessed with the 12-item Duty Orientation
scale (Hannah et al., 2014). Items were translated into German
using the backtranslation method. Hannah and colleagues
suggested that duty orientation is a higher-order factor that
reflects three subordinate concepts, such as duty to codes, duty
to members, and duty to mission. We therefore used the overall
scale across all items (α = 0.86) and the subscales (duty to codes,
α = 0.78; duty to members, α = 0.78; and duty to mission,
α = 0.77). Sample items include “I do what is right always,” “I
put the interest of my team ahead of my personal interest,” and
“I do whatever it takes to not let the mission of my organization
fail.” Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree;
5 = strongly agree).
Results
To examine convergent validity, we assessed the correlations
between work motivation, duty orientation and the single and
composite measures of compliance and integrity (Table 7).
As shown, among the five integrity-based factors, leader’s
role modeling, accountability and pressure to compromise
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mostly show a convergence with autonomous work motivation
(rs > 0.24, ps < 0.001), while obedience and ill-conceived
goals coincided with more-controlled motivation (rs > 0.21,
ps < 0.001). Among the five compliance-oriented factors,
we mainly found that rule clarity correlated positively with
autonomous motivation (r = 0.25, p< 0.001) and that controlling
(r = 0.22, p< 0.001) with correlated controlled motivation.
Note that for calculating the correlations between the
composite measures of compliance, integrity and work
motivation, the composite measures were constructed after
reverse coding the negative items. Overall, supporting our
expectation, the composite integrity factor correlated positively
with autonomous work motivation (r = 0.37, p < 0.001) and
negatively with controlled motivation (r = −0.11, p < 0.001).
At least partially also supporting our hypothesis, the composite
compliance factor correlated positively with controlled
motivation (r = 0.13, p < 0.001) but also positively with
autonomous motivation (r = 0.27) (even though to a lesser extent
than with the composite integrity factor).
Furthermore, consistent with our expectations, both the
composite integrity and compliance factor correlated positively
with duty orientation (rs > 0.22, ps < 0.001), with leader’s role
modeling and accountability revealing the largest correlations
(rs > 0.30, ps < 0.001). Consistent with our more specific
expectations, the compliance factors correlated somewhat more
positively with duty to codes than did integrity factors, while
integrity factors revealed higher correlations with duty to
members than did compliance factors. Surprisingly, duty to
mission revealed correlations only around zero.
Overall, the patterns of correlations in this study provided
acceptable support for the convergent validity of the GECS.
However, Table 7 also shows that the specific dimensions
composing the compliance or integrity factor do correlate,
though most of them in the expected direction, to various degrees
with work motivation and duty orientation measures, suggesting
that the compliance or integrity factors are not homogeneous
factors but rather overlap somewhat.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research has taken first steps toward developing, refining
and testing a German ethical culture measure. In doing so,
we intended to advance the nomological network of corporate
ethical culture by integrating the notion of compliance- and
integrity-based ethics programs (with its focus on how to steer
organizations) with the notion of ethical culture (with its focus
on what factors inhibit or foster ethical behavior). In several
studies involving more than 2000 participants, we presented first
evidence for the factorial structure, reliability and validity of the
instrument. Concerning the factor structure, fit indices based on
data from various (sub)samples suggested the 10-factor solution
as the best-fitting model among those tested. Considering the
model with two overarching second-order factors (integrity and
compliance) revealed acceptable or nearly acceptable fit indices.
Item reliabilities of all subscales were good, ranging between
0.72 and 0.91. We found supporting convergent and divergent
validity of the scale derived from CFA in most cases across
the two samples.
Further supporting convergent validity of the scale, we
found that compliance and integrity factors were in most cases
predictably related to different forms of work motivation and
duty orientation. The correlations were mostly modest but
still significant. Composite compliance and integrity factors
were mostly related in expected directions with controlled
and autonomous work motivation and with variants of
duty orientation (duty to codes and duty to members).
The composite integrity factor was positively related to
autonomous motivation but negatively to controlled motivation.
The composite compliance factor, on the other hand, correlated
positively with controlled motivation. However, somewhat
unexpected was that the composite scale of compliance factors
also correlated with perceived autonomous motivation (although
to a lesser extent than did the composite integrity factor).
This correlation may suggest that compliance factors can
also be advantageous to autonomous motivation. As will be
discussed later, this finding may provide an interesting avenue for
future research.
Furthermore, the GECS revealed good predictive validity.
Our studies showed that both compliance and integrity factors
predicted significantly deviant workplace behavior beyond the
formal factors of ethics programs. At the same time, the analyses
of incremental validity stressed the added value of integrity
factors in predicting deviant workplace behavior over and above
compliance-base factors. Specifically, the integrity-based factors
accounted for a 15% additional amount of variance beyond
compliance factors. Consistent with previous studies (Treviño
et al., 1999; Tyler and Blader, 2005), these results support the
view that organizational strategies and factors relying on the
monitoring of rule adherence may not be the only means of
shaping people’s deviant behavior. Moreover, in the research
reported here, the utility of a command and control approach
overall appears to be weaker than that of an integrity- or value-
oriented approach that attempts to influence ethical behavior by
encouraging employee’s self-responsibility and moral motivation.
Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and ethics
programs factors, the model including the compliance factors
explained 33% of the variance of deviant workplace behavior,
but the model including the integrity factors explained 46%
of the variance.
Clearly, it would be useful to study the GECS together with
other ethical culture approaches to examine the criteria and
incremental validity of the GECS compared to those of other
models. In our current research, we refrained from including
other ethical culture questionnaires in our surveys simply to
avoid too much burden from too lengthy questionnaires (e.g.,
the ethical culture questionnaire, the CEV, by Kaptein, 2008a,
contains 58 items). Measurement economy must always be
accounted for and carefully balanced out when running such
studies. Nevertheless, a first rough comparison between the GECS
and the CEV may be given building on Kaptein’s study (Kaptein,
2011), which included the nearly identical observed work deviant
behavior scale as in our study. (The only differences were that
Kaptein’s study included a list of 37 items of observed deviant
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TABLE 7 | Relation between GECS, work motivation and duty orientation (Sample C, Study 3).
GECS M (SD) Controlled Autonomous Duty Duty Duty to Duty to
motivation motivation orientation to codes members mission
Controlling 3.19 (0.97) 0.22∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Sanctioning 3.41 (0.90) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Rule clarity 3.89 (0.98) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Rule defectiveness 2.86 (1.05) 0.06 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.09∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Rule viability 2.91 (1.05) 0.10∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.02
Accountability 3.57 (0.82) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Leader’s role modeling 3.51 (1.02) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Pressure to compromise 2.28 (1.08) 0.11∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.08∗
Obedience 2.95 (1.14) 0.21∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.07∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗
Ill-conceived goals 2.54 (0.99) 0.30∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Composite compliance factor 3.35 (0.61) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
Composite integrity factor 3.46 (0.73) −0.11∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.00
To calculate the composite compliance and integrity factors, items from the scales rule defectiveness, viability, pressure to compromise, obedience and ill-conceived goals
were reversed. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.00.
workplace behavior and a general score calculated by averaging
the scores across all items. Our study included a list of 19
behavioral items, and we calculated a general score by summing
across all dichotomized items.) Conducting regression analyses,
the author found that a model entering sociodemographic
variables, formal factors of ethics programs and ethical climate
(Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988) accounted for 14% of the variance
in observed unethical behavior. Upon entering the CEV, the
exploratory power of the complete model increased to 31%. In
our study, the analyses revealed that entering sociodemographic
and formal factors of ethics programs accounted for 6% of
the variance in observed unethical behavior. Upon entering the
GECS with the 10 factors, the exploratory power of the complete
model increased to 48%. This result is promising and indicates
that, at least in this case, our measure appears to be superior in
predicting observed unethical behavior.
This measure has several strengths. As a novelty, this measure
integrates the notion of compliance- and integrity-based ethics
program (with its focus on how to steer organizations) with
the notion of ethical culture (with its focus on what factors
inhibit or foster ethical behavior). To our knowledge, prior
research on climate or culture has never considered this
association, despite the prominence of the compliance and
integrity distinction in theory and practice. At the same time,
studies on compliance- and integrity-based ethics management
have rarely conducted rigorous empirical research. We took
the challenge to develop a measure to address the gap.
Data gathered to test the scale were obtained across large
samples, in two countries (Germany and Switzerland), and
across a wide variety of organizations and jobs. This data
collection is not taken for granted since many studies in this
domain gather data within single organizations. Hence, the
heterogeneity of our data allows some confidence to claim
that the GECS is applicable across varying organizational
contexts. Offering researchers a German scale will allow them
to conduct stringent research in German-speaking countries
on antecedents and consequences of compliance and integrity-
oriented organizational cultures. In addition, such a measure
allows organizations, risk managers and compliance officers
to reflect the current state of corporate ethical culture within
their own organizations, to design targeted interventions and to
monitor organizational progress.
The present measure also represents an advancement to
existing instruments in terms of including less-problematic
item wording (to minimize social desirability, we avoided
terms such as “moral”) and including current theoretical
concepts. Drawing on important insights from behavioral ethics
social psychology and organizational research, our measure
incorporated dimensions such as ill-conceived goals, pressure
to compromise and accountability. Furthermore, building on
insights from practitioners, we incorporated dimensions such as
rule defectiveness and rule viability. These concepts have thus far
not been addressed in prior measures. In fact, it is interesting
that nearly all of these factors were the most relevant predictors
of deviant workplace behavior. Of course, we do not claim that
our measure contains all relevant dimensions, but the findings
indicate that our measure contains at least some important
dimensions over and above previous measures.
Though the current measure is in German, we do not
believe that the content is only applicable and relevant for
the German-speaking world. In fact, compliance and integrity-
based ethics programs are the leading approaches to ethics
in today’s business world (e.g., OECD, 2009). Therefore, the
application of the instrument in other countries would be not
only very meaningful but also needed. Clearly, this process would
also require testing and validation of the instrument in other
languages and countries.
This research also has interesting implications for practice
and future research. As mentioned above, the GECS offers
practitioners a framework and measure to examine their state and
progress within their own organization. In addition, our finding
that integrity-based factors account for an additional amount
of variance beyond compliance factors is relevant for practice,
since most companies currently appear to focus primarily
on improving control and command strategies in combating
unethical behavior. Our results, however, strongly suggest that
more attention should be focused on procedures that promote
self-regulation and responsibility.
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The GECS is also a basis for addressing empirical questions
about the antecedents and consequences of compliance- and
integrity-oriented cultures. Integrating the compliance and
integrity distinction offers a unique opportunity to steer research
in new directions. One fruitful direction for future research
is certainly related to studying the various implicit or explicit
assumptions about how compliance- and integrity-based cultures
may be associated with employee motivation, attitudes and
behavior (Paine, 1994; Verhezen, 2010). However, many of
those assumptions still await empirical examination. In a
recent theoretical paper, Stimmler and Tanner (2019) proposed
that the potential implications of a compliance- or integrity-
oriented culture may be better understood when considered
in combination with perceptual, motivational, affective and
behavioral processes at the individual level. For example, the
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) can provide us with
an interesting heuristic to deepen our understanding of what the
psychological implications for the individual might be when an
organization counts more on a compliance or integrity culture.
With a regulatory focus, people can regulate their behavior via
a prevention or promotion focus. Numerous empirical studies
have shown that these different foci evoke different psychological
processes (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2001). We hypothesize that a
compliance-oriented culture may be more likely to evoke a
prevention focus, while an integrity-oriented culture may be
more likely to support a promotion focus among employees. This
avenue may be interesting for future research to examine these
relations more thoroughly.
One specific direction for future research also relates
to the, as mentioned above, somewhat unexpected finding
that the composite compliance factor also correlated with
autonomous work motivation. This finding could point to
positive implications associated with compliance-oriented
culture worth examining in more detail. Interestingly, empirical
research in this domain is nearly absent, even though, for
instance, the question about the possible implications of
monitoring employees has been highly debated for many
years (Frey, 1993; Ferrin et al., 2007). This literature primarily
expect negative effects on employee work effort and intrinsic
motivation. However, we speculate that, besides the potentially
negative implications of a control- and command approach,
such an approach may also be likely to provide employees with a
comfortable feeling of certainty about the processes in the firm.
An integrity-based culture, on the other hand, with its focus on
encouraging self-governance, may create more uncertainty and
uneasiness since it lacks explicit guidelines. It seems obvious
that both compliance and integrity-oriented strategies are
necessary for an effective ethical business culture. Nonetheless,
our knowledge about the negative and positive implications
associated with a compliance and an integrity-oriented culture
and what combination or interplay may be most effective is
severely limited.
Also interesting is the finding that leader’s role modeling
did not emerge as a significant predictor of deviant workplace
behavior, though past studies strongly emphasized the relevance
of the “tone of the top” and leaders being role models to
encourage similar behaviors among employees (e.g., Treviño
et al., 1999; Kaptein, 2011). Leader’s role modeling, however,
correlated highly positively with autonomous work motivation.
This result suggests that role modeling is possibly more
relevant for motivation than for behavior implications. Another
possibility may be that leader’s role modeling is more likely
to moderate the relationship between some other cultural
dimensions and unethical behavior. It remains open for research
to examine this issue in further detail.
Of course, this research also has limitations. The first one is
associated with the fact that our analyses (CFA) revealed only
moderate statistical support for dividing the single factors into
composite compliance and integrity components. Although the
GECS provides a first essential step in assessing compliance or
integrity-based cultures, an important endeavor for further work
is to further ameliorate the items and foci. In fact, whereas there
is a fair consensus in the literature about what the governance
strategies of a compliance-based program (such as control,
monitoring, and sanctioning) are, there are still divers opinions
about exactly what procedures constitute an integrity-based
program. Thus far, we suggested accountability and leader’s role
modeling as crucial building blocks of an integrity culture. Future
discussions and work will probably reveal further strategies that
may then be incorporated into the GECS.
Another limitation refers to the fact that some expectations
about the relations between compliance and integrity factors were
not confirmed. For example, in contrast to our expectations,
integrity factors did not correlate with duty to mission (neither
did the compliance factors). This finding might be caused by the
fact that the duty orientation scale was originally developed in
the context of army soldiers (Hannah et al., 2014). According
to Hannah et al. (2014) and taking a closer look at the
duty to mission items, this subconcept is about individual’s
willingness to make personal sacrifices and accept personal risks
to achieve the goals of the group. We suppose that in the
context of “normal” organizational life, such expectations of
employees are too unrealistic and therefore likely to result in
correlations around zero.
Finally, a limitation of this research may be the possibility
of a common method bias. Recall that in study 2, the same
respondents answered the GECS and deviant workplace behavior
questions. One strength of our studies is that data were
collected from heterogeneous samples, including employees
and managers across various organizations. This variety has
allowed us to examine the robustness of the proposed structure
across heterogeneous organizational contexts. Although we
administered observed rather than self-reported misconduct and
used different response formats to assess the predictor and
criterion variables to reduce this problem, we cannot completely
exclude the possibility that the associations between the predictor
and criterion measures may be biased. Thus, future research
should attempt to collaborate with single organizations and to
assess the predictor and criterion variable for different employees
from the same working groups within an organization.
Overall, we believe that the GECS provides a first measure to
build upon to advance research in German-speaking countries,
to provide a basis for empirically examining antecedents and
the short- and long-term consequences of compliance- and
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integrity-based cultures, and to improve our understanding of
the influences that may hinder or facilitate the effectiveness of
such procedures. In this vein, we strongly believe that the GECS
can fuel future research and make contributions to the field of
organizational ethics.
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